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ABSTRACT 
Mongolia entered a new security environment with the end of the Cold War. The 
demise of Mongolia's former mentor and protector, the Soviet Union, and the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from its territory have offered opportunities and challenges for its policy 
makers. On the positive side, breaking free from narrow geostrategic frameworks, 
Mongolia is now allowed to chart its own future by pursuing a more balanced policy 
towards its sole neighbors, Russia and China, as well as by exploring the opportunities 
for closer ties with the outside world. On the negative side, the end of Moscow's security 
umbrella heightened Ulaanbaatar's security vulnerability. Now it has to cope on its own 
with the entire spectrum of threats to its security. 
This thesis examines the dilemmas and opportunities facing Mongolia in the post-
Cold War, post-Soviet Union world by analyzing its fast-changing relations with Russia 
and China. Specifically, this study will focus on Mongolia's search for a "third option" -
reliable security and economic partners - to ensure its security. 
This thesis contends that while pursuing a balanced and neutral stance towards its 
powerful neighbors, the best strategy for Ulaanbaatar to secure the national independence 
and economic survival is to establish counterweights to Moscow and Beijing's influence 
through cooperation with the wider international community, through an active 
participation in regional and international arrangements, and by contribution to the 
creation of a regional security regime in Northeast Asia. A small country like Mongolia 
sees only benefits from multilateral approach. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ... . ......... 1 
A. BACKGROUND ............ 1 
B. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY ... 3 
C. IMPORTANCE OF STUDY. . .. .. ... 4 
D. METHOD OF ANALySIS ... . . ..... ..... 5 
E. STRUCTURE OF THESIS ........ . . .. 5 
II. REVIEW OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE ......... ... ....... ........... .................... 7 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 7 
B. THEORY OF BALANCE OF POWER .................................................. 7 
C. THEORY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITy ................ : .......................... 11 
III. BILATERAL RELATIONS OF MONGOLIA ................................................. 15 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 15 
B. GEOGRAPHY, RESOURCES, AND HISTORY ................................. 16 
C. MONGOLIA'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA .................................... 19 
1. Cold-War Relations ................................................................... 19 
2. Post-Cold War Relations ............................................................ 21 
D. MONGOLIA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA ...................................... 24 
1. Cold-War Relations ................................................................... 24 
2. Post-Cold War Relations ............................................................ 26 
E. MONGOLIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ........... 28 
F. MONGOLIA'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES .............. 32 
G. CONCLUSION ......................... .... .................................... ................ ..... 34 
IV. MONGOLIA'S OPTIONS .......................................................................... ...... 37 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................. ............................................. .. . 37 
B. BALANCE OF POWER APPROACH ................................................. 38 
1. The Past. ..................................................................................... 38 
2. The Present: Is This Possible? .................................................. .40 
C. MULTILATERAL APPROACH ......................................................... .44 
1. Asia- Pacific Multilateral Arrangements: Overview ............... .45 
2. Multilateral Options for Mongolia ............................................ .47 
3. Mongolia's International and Regional Cooperation ................ .49 
D. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 51 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION .................................................................. 55 
BIBLIOGRAPHy .................. . 




THIS P AGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
Vlll 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the dilemmas and opportunities facing Mongolia in the post-
Cold War, post-Soviet Union world by analyzing its fast-changing relations with its two 
powerful neighbors, Russia and China. Specifically, this study will focus on Mongolia's 
search for the "third option" - new security and economic partners - to ensure its security 
and economic survival. 
The fall of its patron, the Soviet Union, and withdrawal of the Soviet troops from 
its territory created a new security environment for Mongolia. Mongolia's policy makers 
face opportunities and challenges. On one hand, the country ends its role as a pawn in the 
relations between its neighbors and is allowed to pursue an even-handed policy towards 
them and to explore opportunities for closer ties with the outside world beyond its narrow 
geopolitical confines of position. On the other hand, Mongolia is left without a security 
umbrella, heightening its security vulnerability. Now Mongolians have to cope on their 
own with the entire spectrum of threats - military, economic, and ideological - to their 
security. Although the broader external environment surrounding Mongolia has changed 
favorably, it still contains uncertainties that inspire concerns. Mongolians are looking for 
a new reliable security guarantee. This thesis contends that the best strategy for the 
country to secure its national independence and economic survival is to establish 
counterweights to Moscow and Beijing through cooperation with the wider international 
community and an active engagement in regional and international arrangements while 
maintaining a balanced policy towards its two great powers. A small country, like 
Mongolia, sees only benefits from a multilateral approach. 
IX 
In addition, this study reflects the argument that much of its future ties with and 
support from the community of free nations, as well as its geopolitical weight in the 
region, will also depend on the outcome of its on-going practice with parliamentary 
democracy. It has been a decade since Mongolia abandoned one-party communist rule 
and undertook the challenge of a simultaneous transition towards democracy and 
capitalism. 
The thesis synthesizes works of many scholars who have dealt with the aspects of 
Mongolian security issues. The study describes alternative theories of international 
relations, such as a balance of power and collective security, to establish a framework of 
analysis. It adapts the approaches presented by Kenneth N. Waltz in the Theory of 
International Politics, Glenn H. Snyder in the Alliance Theory: A Neutralist First Cut, 
and David W. Ziegler in the War, Peace, and International Politics. Extensive reviews of 
bibliographic material and open-source publications are used to assess the external 
security envirotiment of Mongolia, current and future security trends in the Northeast 
Asia region to which it belongs, Mongolia's attempts to maintain a delicate balance with 
its two neighbors, its bilateral relations with other regional and world powers, and its 
involvement in multilateral security arrangements. 
The results indicate that great emphasis placed by Ulaanbaatar on the expansion 
and consolidation of its political and diplomatic ties results from its limited military 
capability, since the security of a country with a small popUlation cannot depend on 
military power. Entering into alignment with a third military power could offset such 
vulnerability. However, the diminishing role of ideology and military power as a primary 
means of defining global and regional relations, the relatively peaceful environment in 
x 
Northeast Asia, as well as Mongolia's historical lesson of excessive dependence on one 
particular state and the costs entailed by such relationship, prevent the country from 
taking such a step. It would unduly alann and provoke suspicion in Russia and China and 
might set off a spiral of mistrust towards Mongolia among these powers or. Therefore, a 
new "National Security Concept" states that in peacetime Mongolia will not be part of 
any military alliance and will strictly adhere to the policy of not allowing foreign troops 
to enter, be stationed in, or pass through the national territory in the absence of relevant 
Mongolian legislation. 
Mongolia's detennination to pursue such a non-aligned, neutral policy and to 
expand and strengthen its ties with free world offers the most viable way of insuring 
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The end of the Cold War, the full normalization of Sino-SovietlRussian relations, 
and the break-up of the Soviet Union ends Mongolia's role as a pawn in the power 
politics of its two powerful neighbors. This allows Mongolia to chart its own future and 
explore opportunities for closer ties with the outside world beyond its narrow geopolitical 
confines. 
For eight decades, Mongolia served as a large buffer state between China and 
Russia. Figuring prominently in Russian and Chinese national security interests, it was an 
important factor in their balance of power calculations.! The ideal situation for Mongolia 
was to maintain positive relations between both of these countries. However, Mongolia' s 
historical animosity and mistrust of China, its geostrategic location, and the bipolar 
nature of the Cold War created only limited alternatives for Ulaanbaatar. These 
conditions meant that the only realistic alternative was for Mongolia to align with its 
northern neighbor. This was the lesser of two evils. The Soviet Union developed into 
Mongolia's mentor, providing military and economic aid from 1921 onward. 
Since the fall of its mentor and protector, Mongolia has seen both dilemmas and 
opportunities. The positive effect is that Mongolia has broken free from narrow 
geostrategic frameworks. Mongolia can now pursue an independent policy and expand 
the horizon of its diplomatic ties. Mongolia has acquired a greater international focus that 
it lacked in the past due to the Soviet military presence. Mongolia's relationship with the 
1 Ravdan Bold, "Adrift without the Soviets," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 October 1991, 30. 
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Soviet Union ensured its existence as a nation-state. However, it entailed tremendous 
political and social costs: 
• Restriction of independent foreign policy, 
• Continued hostile relations with China, 
• Significant dilution of national sovereignty, 
• Limited economic growth and possibilities, 
• Gained external enemies. 
On the negative side, Russia's strategic abandonment has heightened Mongolia' s 
security concerns. The national security of a country with a small population and vast 
territory cannot depend solely on its military power. Mongolia' s dilemma is to offset such 
inability and produce a sense of security. An alliance with a third power would satisfy 
this requirement. However, such an attempt to enhance its security would alarm Russia 
and China, provoke their suspicion, and set off a spiral of hostility. This might lead to 
their adoption of adversarial policies. Such policies would negatively affect Mongolia's 
economic development. Without a functioning regional collective security system in 
northern Asia, therefore, Mongolia cannot afford to ignore regional uncertainties, the rise 
in China's military expenditures, and changes in China's foreign policy. 
The demise of its main trading partner, the Soviet Union, has had senous 
economic implications. The breakdown of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) resulted in the collapse of Mongolia's economy. After several years of negative 
growth, the economy is now recovering. However, it still has a long way to go. 
Mongolia desires to take advantage of this period of international and regional 
stability to concentrate on its economic development. However, it remains in a position 
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of strategic vulnerability. As Mongolia moves toward an uncertain future and away from 
Russia, China emerges as the primary concern. Ulaanbaatar seeks to learn from past 
mistakes and not suffer again at the hands of powerful countries. 
Mongolia is pursuing a foreign policy of active neutrality with a focus on 
multilateralism. This policy contains the following four elements: 
• Maintaining a balanced relationship with Russia and China, 
• Enhanced relations with countries in the West and East, especially the United 
States, Japan and Germany, 
• Active participation on the issues of strengthening regional security, 
• Creating a collective security mechanism in Northeast Asia. 
This strategy offers the most viable way of insuring Mongolia's continued independence 
and sovereignty. 
B. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to examine the dilemmas and opportunities facing 
Mongolia in the post-Cold War, post-Soviet Union world. This will be accomplished by 
analyzing Ulaanbaatar's changing relations with Russia, China, and other influential 
countries. Specifically, this study will focus on Mongolia's search for a "third option" 
that rests on multiple reliable economic and security partners. 
This study addresses four primary questions. 
• What are the pros and cons of the different security options facing a small country 
in a region dominated by two or more superpowers? 
• How can such countries escape the geographic limitations? 
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• How may such countries achieve a balance in bilateral relations with neighboring 
countries? 
• What kinds of structures ameliorate the impact of anarchy and the security 
dilemma in the region? 
The answers to these questions are explained at the systems level of international 
relations. This thesis contends that the logic of the interstate relationships from the Cold 
War era "balance of power" is not acceptable in the new environment. While pursuing a 
balanced and neutral stance, the best strategy for Ulaanbaatar is to establish 
counterweights to Moscow and Beijing's influence. Mongolia sees the accomplishment 
of this strategy through cooperation with the wider international community, active 
participation at international forums, and contribution to forming a regional security 
regime. 
In addition, the author believes that the future of Mongolia's ties with and support 
from the community of free nations will depend in great part on its on-going practice of 
parliamentarian democracy_ 
c. IMPORTANCE OF STUDY 
The significance of this study is two-fold. Firstly, it seeks to analyze Mongolia's 
foreign policy transition beyond the narrow Cold War geostrategic framework between 
its two neighboring powers. It assesses Mongolia's security challenges as it mo'ves away 
from Russia towards an uncertain future where the great concern is China. In this new 
environment, it remains vulnerable to possible future threats and intimidation from 
China. Secondly, the thesis analyzes the factors that block and favor the development of 
multilateral security architecture in Northeast Asia. Mongolia advocates the development 
4 
of such a multilateral institution to supplement bilateral relations and ensure the security 
of the region. 
D. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
This study employs the system-level approach to understanding the present and 
future Mongolian foreign policy. Focusing on the international structure and the 
interactions of states, this study presumes that a country's foreign policy is a reaction to 
threats, uncertainties, and opportunities in the state's external environment. The national 
security of Mongolia is a part of the broader international security and as such, it is 
directly dependent on the latter. 
E. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 
II reviews the literature on international relations, specifically theories of balance of 
power and ofmultilateralism, to highlight the pros and cons of these two different options 
a small country might choose. Chapter III identifies how international changes since early 
1990s have created new security challenges and opportunities for Mongolia and analyze 
the bilateral relations of Mongolia with its two neighbors, Russia and China, and other 
countries. Chapter IV discusses multilateral security options of Mongolia and reflects on 
the factors blocking and favoring the development of regional security architecture in 
Northeast Asia. The final chapter offers conclusions about the external behavior of 
Mongolia. 
5 
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II. REVIEW OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the literature on the general concept of security of nation-
states and the approaches through which they seek to insure their security and economic 
survival. For most of the past century, Mongolia has pursued a "balance of power" 
foreign policy through the influence of the Soviet Union. This system is no longer 
applicable in the current security environment of Northeast Asia. Mongolia must find 
another framework for its foreign policy. The approach recommended here is multilateral 
"collective security." The chapter will detail these approaches to security - neorealist 
"balance of power" and neoliberal "collective security." These provide a framework for 
interpreting and explaining security practices and behavior of states. Neorealists claim 
that pursuit of security must be competitive and based on self-help, and based on military 
power playing a crucial role. However, they posit that self-help does not rule out seeking 
assistance from others by forming alliances. Collective security argues that in an anarchic 
environment, states can achieve security through cooperation. In the current security 
environment, this is the more rational approach. 
B. THEORY OF BALANCE OF POWER 
According to the neorealists, the main purpose attributed to balance of power is 
the quest for national security, defined as survival, in a world of anarchy. They argue that 
all other goals are lost unless a state makes provision for one's security. Kenneth Waltz in 
his Theory of International Politics says that state leaders strive to achieve this objective 
through internal efforts, such as increasing economic capability and military strength, and 
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external efforts, such as strengthening and enlarging one's own alliances or weakening 
and shrinking opposing ones.2 
Further, neorealists hold that the structure of the international system directly 
affects the conditions under which alliances are formed, the issue of whom to ally with, 
and how the ratio of benefits and costs is calculated. Thus, alliance formation in a 
multipolar world differs from what takes place in a bipolar system.3 States either balance 
if they ally with weaker states in opposition to a principal hegemonic source of danger, or 
states bandwagon when they ally with the state that poses the major threat. In the latter 
case, there is no formation of balance of power. Instead, bandwagoning states contribute 
to creating world hegemony.4 
Small states join alliances because they must rely fundamentally on other states, 
while great powers seek alignments with small states both for the political and military 
gains afforded. The logic of neorealism leads to the conclusion that states form alliances 
as a result of perceived benefits greater than the assumed costs. The need for an alliance 
and the extent to which each prospective partner meets that need largely determine the 
size of relative benefits and costs. The greater the shortfall between one's own military 
capability and that of its most likely antagonist and the higher the perceived threat from 
that opponent, the greater a state's alliance need. 
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (University of California, Berkeley: McGraw-Hill, 
Inc., 1979), 118. 
3 Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neutralist First Cut" in The Evolution of Theory in International 
Relations, ed. Robert L. Rothstein (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991),90; Kenneth N. 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (University of California, Berkeley: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979), 118. 
4 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (University of California, Berkeley: McGraw-Hill, 
Inc., 1979), 126. 
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The security benefits from alliances include greater deterrence, a stronger defense, 
and a preclusion of the ally's alliance with one's adversary. The costs entailed from 
membership in an alliance may be increased risk of war, alienation of an ally's enemy, 
and reduced freedom of action, as a result of the promissory obligations by each side 
contained in the alliance to take specific actions in the event of contingencies.5 
In a multipolar system determining who is a danger to whom and who can be 
expected to deal with threats and problems is often unclear. States have an incentive to 
come to the assistance of each other in the event of attack by an outside party; otherwise, 
the attacker's power resources may be substantially increased. This is the logic of 
balance-of-power theory. There are no peacetime alliances. However, alliances formed at 
peacetime with the goal of reducing the insecurity of anarchy and which are not directed 
at any specific opponent may be perceived by other states as a threat to their security and 
may provoke counter-alliance. 
According to Glenn Snyder, parties within an alliance have twin fears, termed as 
abandonment and entrapment. Together these dangers constitute the alliance security 
dilemma: increasing one's commitment to the alliance may increase the risk of being 
dragged into a war over the ally's interests that one does not share, but the effort to 
reduce the danger of entrapment may lead to a risk of being abandoned.6 Glenn Snyder 
suggests that there is a perceived tradeoff between entrapment and abandonment, in 
which allies seek to maintain an optimal balance. The less the dependence of a state on 
5 Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neutralist First Cut" in The Evolution of Theory in International 
Relations, ed. Robert L. Rothstein (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 90. 
6 Ibid., 93. 
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the alliance for its security, the greater is the state's likelihood of having flexibility of 
action and bargaining strength within the alliance. However, this dependence may change 
as a result of changes in individual members' security environment or in the degree of 
threat. 
In a bipolar system, states form an alliance with a clear understanding of who is 
the adversary. Since allies add relatively little to the superpowers' capabilities, alliance 
leaders make their strategies mainly according to their own calculations and interests'? 
The system structure provides little or no opportunity for states to defect, or if they have 
an incentive, they will be prevented by their own patron. The alliance security dilemma is 
weak since the danger of abandonment is low. The fear of entrapment is present for both 
the superpowers and their clients. Given the dependency relationships and the absence of 
alignment alternatives, the potential for fracturing the alliance is lower under conditions 
of bipolarity than in situations of multi polarity. 
What happens to alliances when interests diverge and the possibility of alliance 
disintegration increases? Realists suggest that such a condition tends to arise in the 
aftermath of major wars or during periods when the international distribution of power 
undergoes fundamental change. In such periods, states weigh their interests and values 
against normative standards underlying the alliance commitment. The formation, 
maintenance, and termination of alliances have important implications for the stability of 
the international system. 
7 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (University of California, Berkeley: McGraw-Hill, 
Inc., 1979), 169, 171. 
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C. THEORY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
Collective security is considered to be sharply at variance with neorealism and, 
thus, to be the opposite of balance of power politics. Instead, it stresses international legal 
rights and obligations as regulators for the preservation of international peace, a heavy 
reliance on reason in human affairs, and confidence in the peace-building function of 
world public opinion. 
Generally, collective security is an approach to peace involving an agreement by 
which states promise to take collective action against any states defined as an aggressor. 
In his study War, Peace, and International Politics, David Ziegler holds that the purpose 
of collective security is to solve problems within the system and keep peace among its 
members, not to protect them against external enemies. 
As neorealist balance of power politics attaches central importance to power, the 
collective security approach similarly acknowledges power, but the latter seeks to 
subordinate that power to international institutions that possess authority. The collective 
security system forbids its members to resort to force to settle disputes and requires them 
to use force to punish any member that does.8 These are two ways through which such 
collective security infringes on the traditional rights of sovereign states; in all other 
respects, states remain independent to pursue other national interests, compete for trade, 
and run their domestic affairs as they fit. 9 
8 David W. Ziegler, War, Peace, and International Politics - 8th ed. (Longman: Addison-Wesley 
Educational Publishers Inc., 2000),199. 
9 Ibid., 200. 
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Emphasizing how the international relationship should be conducted, collective 
security theorists disdain national armaments, secret treaties of alliances and balance-of-
power politics. Alliances are ruled out among members of a collective security 
community. According to David Ziegler, a state does not have to designate a few states as 
trustworthy since all other states in the system will automatically become allies in case of 
aggression. Collective security advocates posit that alliance fonnation at any other time 
only arises suspicion. 
Collective security arrangements insure the security of all states, big and small 
alike. A country that uses force for any reason whatsoever and violates "territorial 
integrity and political independence" will face not just a single victim but also a 
collective response. IO At same time, collective security obliges all states to participate in 
sanctions against an aggressor - the system does not pennit a policy of neutrality or 
isolation. 
Besides the benefits presented above, David Zeigler points out the weaknesses of 
collective security community. He detects the problem of agreeing on what constitutes 
"an aggression." The classic fonnulation of "violation of territorial integrity and political 
independence" is not adequate. Although the developments of international events and 
need for an explicit and unambiguous criteria on which to act led to adopt a more broad 
definition covering many kinds of behavior, the acts listed in that definition were not 
exhaustive, which in tum produced loopholes. 
10 "Violation of territorial integrity and political independence" is a typical formulation for the aggression 
as cited in David W. Ziegler, War, Peace, and International Politics - 8th ed. (Longman: Addison-Wesley 
Educational Publishers Inc., 2000), 199. 
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A second problem, according to David Zeigler, is getting all states to participate 
in collective action against an aggressor. If the distribution of power is unequal among 
the members of a collective security system, refusal by smaller states to join in actions 
does not much matter. However, reluctance of one or two major states does. Such refusal 
may derive from their self-interest or the fact that the aggressor is a powerful neighbor, 
long-standing ally, or the perceived victim. In addition, geographical remoteness may 
produce reluctance as well. 
Another challenge facing a collective security system is the organization's slow 
reaction to crises, which results from the difficulty of finding facts and determining who 
is at fault and of the impossibility of planning actions before the actual invasion occurs or 
on the basis of suspicion. 
The theory, as well as its practice, suggests that such a system can work more 
effectively on a regional level. Supporters of regional collective security systems argue 
that only at this level can realistic solutions to problems be found. By limiting 
membership to states in a geographic region, regionalists contend, the regional security 
architecture will better work in maintaining peace among its members. Success may 
result due to the proximity of member states to each other or to members' common 
interests, similar resources or identical problems, or sense of regional identity, enhanced 
by the actions and attitudes of states external to the region. Other factors, such as a 
certain degree of shared linguistic, cultural, historical, or social bonds, a relatively high 
degree of integration, or regularity of interactions among national elites or people, may 
contribute to successful implementation of principles of collective security. All these will 
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enable the states to understand regional disputes better and come up with appropriate 
solutions. 
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III. BILATERAL RELATIONS OF MONGOLIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
While serving as a buffer state during the Cold War, Mongolia participated in the 
defense system of the Warsaw Pact, acting as the USSR's eastern frontier. It effectively 
shielded the former Soviet Union from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The 
collapse of the Soviet Bloc and China's new international strength prompted a wholly 
new international situation. This profoundly changed the basis of Mongolia's 
international relations and security doctrine. Due to these dramatic shifts in the external 
security environment, Mongolia has developed new approaches to its national security. 
The critical factor is a balanced relationship with both of its two neighbors. Mongolia's 
relations with them loom largest, given their close proximity and the fact that both have a 
history of dominance over Mongolia. The key orientation in the country's foreign policy -
relying on a third force - complements this need for balance. The diversification of its 
relationships is in the best interest of Mongolia. 
This chapter will analyze Ulaanbaatar's past and present relations with Mongolia's 
neighboring powers and other influential countries. It will emphasize the importance of 
maintaining close and constructive relations with them. This study stresses a policy that 
preserves good relations with both Russia and China, without taking either's line, as the 
wisest. Ulaanbaatar's determination to foster regional security and stability is significant 
in the development of external relations. For example, the Mongolian government's 
declaration of its territory as a "single state" nuclear free zone avoids past mistakes and 
reinforces stability in this strategically sensitive region. 
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In this chapter, brief background infonnation about Mongolia precedes the analysis. 
Geography, resources, and history affect the construction of Mongolia's security. The 
historical developments that fonn Mongolia's security conception include: 
• f:ontinuous struggle to establish and consolidate a Mongol nation; 
• wars fought among the various nations of the proto-Mongol state as well as 
against its neighbors; 
• the ignominy of being subsumed by Manchu dynasty; 
• efforts to achieve national unity in confronting the Manchus and regain self-
detennination; 
• post-independence efforts against annexation and absorption policy of Mongolian 
territory by its powerful neighbors; 
• post-1945 struggle to sustain relative independence and national identity under the 
Soviet empire; 
• confrontation with China during the height of the Cold War; 
• efforts to maintain state sovereignty and reinforce the independence in the post-
Cold War, post-Soviet world. 
These factors fonned Mongolia's past framework for operating III the international 
community. 
B. GEOGRAPHY, RESOURCES, AND HISTORY 
Mongolia is geographically isolated. It is land locked, sharing a 2,178-mile 
frontier with Russia to the north and a 2,923-mile with China to the south, east, and west. 
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It encompasses a territory of about 604,250 square miles, with a population of 2.6 
million. 
Mongolia IS rich in natural resources. Mongolia's mineral deposits include 
copper, gold, silver, iron, chrome, zinc, tungsten, and mercury. Large deposits of coal and 
oil have been found. A major source of livelihood is livestock, which numbered 30 
million in 2000. 11 The economic development of Mongolia's natural resources has been 
poor as its low per capita GDP of some US$400 in 1999 shows. 
Historically, the nation-state of Mongolia is the successor to the Great Mongol 
Empire. The empire controlled China and Russia from the late 13th through the 14th and 
16th centuries respectively. The decline of Mongol power presented its neighbors 
opportunities to regain lost territories and expand their control and influence. The result 
was division of greater Mongolia between its two stronger neighbors during the 1 i h 
century. It gradually underwent a transformation from "pivot to a mere pawn in a wider 
Great Game" in Central and Inner Asia. 12 In the late 17th century, "Outer" Mongolia fell 
under the control of the Manchu Qing dynasty in China, where it remained until 1911. 
Support from Russia enabled Mongolia to proclaim its independence from the Manchu 
empire. Outer Mongolia's rationale for declaring its independence was that its allegiance 
was to the Manchus, and not to China. I3 In November 1924, Outer Mongolia changed its 
11 Mongolia's 2000 Statistics Data, Udur Toli (Daily News), No. 023(586),27 January 2001. 
12 Marko Milivojevic, The Mongolian Revolution of 1990: Stability or Conflict in Inner Asia? (Conflict 
Studies No. 242, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, June 1991), 16. 
13 "Historical path of Mongolia's Statehood and Independence." Available [OnLine] 
http://www.undp.org/rnissions/mongolialhistdoc.htrn [Feb 10,2000]. 
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name to the "Mongolian People's Republic" (MPR) with a capital at Ulaanbaatar. 
Mongolia remained nominally under Chinese suzerainty under Sino-Russian and Sino-
Soviet agreements and treaties of1913, 1915, and 1924.14 In 1946, the RepUblic of China 
government recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia following the plebiscite in 
favor of independence. IS Several factors influenced Mongols to side with the Soviets. 
These included: 
• Opposition to China was one important respect where Mongolian national 
interests coincided with Russian strategic interests. 
• The Russian threat was indirect. The Soviets were unlikely to move in, dominate, 
and assimilate the Mongols as the Chinese have shown through takeover of Inner 
Mongolia. 
• Improved health and education assured physical survival for Mongols. 
• The Soviets provided a comparatively large economic assistance. 
Led by strategic considerations, the Soviets shaped the MPR in a manner that served to 
its own interests. Before the Cold War entered East Asia, Mongolia was already on the 
Soviets' side. The principal Soviet goal was to form a defensive buffer, protecting the 
vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railway corridor running south of lake Baikal and close to the 
Mongolian border. Protection of this key point affected the defense of the vital Soviet 
14 Tumurchuluun G., "Mongolia's Foreign Policy Revisited: Relations with Russia and the PRe into the 
1990s" in Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan, ed. Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. 
Ellernan (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1999),279. 
15 "Historical path of Mongolia's Statehood and Independence." Available [OnLine] 
http://www.undp.orglmissions/mongolialhistdoc.htm [Feb 10, 2000] 
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interest in the vast Transbaikal territory and its population. 16 The Soviet influence and 
Chinese irredentism consequently shaped the background for Mongolia's strategic and 
political policies. 
C. MONGOLIA'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 
1. Cold-War Relations 
Although Mongolia, unlike the Central Asian Republics, was not a part of the 
USSR, it relied heavily on the Soviet Union for its survival. Mongolia was a Soviet 
"satellite state."17 The relationship between the two was a "patron-client relationship."18 
The communist regime in Mongolia closely modeled the system and apparatus 
that controlled the Soviet Union. In addition to the direct party-to-party and government-
to-government relations, the two countries developed bilateral ties at other significant 
levels. Soviet ministries, cabinet-level committees, provinces, scholarly and scientific 
institutions, factories, and other organizations directly dealt with their Mongolian 
counterparts. Education of Mongols in the USSR was an important factor in the political 
and cultural relations of the two countries. Several thousand Mongols went for advanced 
training in the USSR. Many Soviets worked as advisers, specialists, and workers in 
16 Robert Rupen, How Mongolia is really ruled: a Political History of the Mongolian People's Republic, 
1900-1978 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979),92. 
17 See Turnurchuluun G., "Mongolia's Foreign Policy Revisited: Relations with Russia and the PRC into 
the 1990s" in Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan, ed. Stephen Kotkin and 
Bruce A. Elleman (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1999). 
18 Mohan Malik, "Mongolia's Policy Options in the Post-Soviet Union" (The Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis),283. 
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Mongolia. The result was a complex relationship in which Soviet influence penetrated 
through ideology, institutional models, and personnel. 
Mongolia did not make a foreign policy decisions without first considering Soviet 
policy. Mongolia's interests were subservient to Soviet security interests. The same 
relationship applied to Mongolia's economic development. Mongolia's solutions for 
economic development were ones that had been developed and used in the Soviet Union. 
The extent of direct Soviet participation and interference in MPR was 
proportional to the degree of tension and threat in the Sino-Soviet relationship. The 
Soviets made little investment in Mongolia until the challenge of China surfaced in the 
late 1950s. Active economic assistance and high-level visits from China led to the visits 
to Mongolia of the chairman of the presidium of the Soviet Supreme Council in 1957 and 
of the Soviet defense minister in 1961. As Moscow-Beijing cooperation turned into 
competition and then confrontation, Moscow-Ulaanbaatar relations strengthened. The 
result was growth in the scale and intensity of Soviet involvement and a substantial 
increase in its investment into Mongolia. The visits of Brezhnev, Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) general secretary, in 1966 and 1974, and of the defense minister in 
1970 and 1981 to Ulaanbaatar illustrated the integral character of Soviet policy towards 
Mongolia. However, the Soviet Union's involvement of Mongolia in "fraternal all-round 
cooperation" was at the expense of Mongolia's own interests. 19 
19 Ravdan Bold, "Northeast Asian security perspectives: the view from Mongolia" in Bold R., Mongolia's 
Strategic View (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 7. 
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The USSR-MPR Mutual Assistance Treaty signed in 1946, renewed in 1966, and 
again in 1986 made it clear that attack on the MPR would be considered an attack on the 
USSR. Until its break-up, the Soviet Union enclosed Mongolia completely within its own 
defense system. When Moscow and Beijing were on the verge of war in 1969, the Soviet 
forces in Mongolia stood at over 100,000 troops, whose arms included fixed and mobile 
intermediate ballistic missiles with nuclear and chemical warheads.2o It was only after 
Gorbachev came to power that Moscow began to downgrade Mongolia as a factor in 
Sino-Soviet relations and announce its intention to pull the troops out of Mongolia in 
1986. 
2. Post-Cold War Relations 
The demise of the Soviet Union III 1991 and the complete Soviet troop 
withdrawal from Mongolia in 1992 "marked the end of Russia's imperialist policy" 
regarding Asian states.2! The binding force of Marxist-Leninist ideology was over. 
Mongolians finally became "genuine masters of their land."22 However, Mongolia 
confronted numerous difficulties. The Sino-Russian joint communique of May 1989 
resulted in effect in strategic abandonment of Mongolia. The alliance previously based on 
the principle of "friendship and all-round cooperation with the Soviet Union as 
Mongolia's only security guarantee" evolved into one based on peaceful coexistence.23 
20 Marko Milivojevic, The Mongolian Revolution of 1990: Stability or Conflict in Inner Asia? (Conflict 
Studies No. 242, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, June 1991), 15. 
21 Russian President Yeltsin's words during the Mongolian President Ochirbat's visit to Moscow in 1993. 
22 "Mongolian Defense White Paper 1997-1998" (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies 1998), 16. 
23 Ravdan Bold, "The Changing International Order and Mongolia's Security" in Bold R., Mongolia·s 
Strategic View (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 32. 
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The collapse of its main trading partner, the Soviet Union, exacerbated Mongolia's 
economic crisis. To make matters worse, the departing Soviets left a bill of 10.5 billion 
rubles (equal to US$16 billion).24 Both sides disputed the debt's size, the dollar 
equivalent, and methods of repayment. Ulaanbaatar pointed out that the Soviet Union had 
monopolized gold, silver, copper, molybdenum, and tin mining in Mongolia, making her 
economically dependent on the Soviet Union and on its terms. Mongolia was then 
obliged to hand over their raw materials at prices dictated by the Russians.25 Ulaanbaatar 
could not persuade Moscow to recalculate the debt or cancel half of it, however. 
Moreover, Russian policy to settle the trade in hard currency starting from January 1, 
1991 had grave consequences on the Mongolian economy. The economic disruptions, 
shortages of the hard currency, Russian taxes, transit tariffs, and custom duties on 
Mongolian goods almost halted Mongolian trade with Russia in 1990-1992. 
Nevertheless, since the two countries embarked on the similar path of democracy 
and free enterprise economy, Moscow and Ulaanbaatar have sought to make fresh start 
and revive their old linkages. In order to end the two years of uncertainty in relations 
between Russia and Mongolia, Mongolian President Ochirbat visited Moscow in January 
1993 and signed a new Treaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation. The treaty 
provided a new legal basis for the associated inter-governmental agreements and 
protocols to facilitate mutual ties. 
24 Ibid., 8. 
25 Alan J.K. Sanders, "Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy" in Mongolia in Transition, ed. Ole Bruun 
and Ole Odgaard (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1996),34. 
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Today, Mongolia strives to maintain cordial relations with Moscow while 
avoiding establishing too close a security relationship. The Russians express their 
willingness to intensify the relations with their "old, true friend" in all spheres.26 The two 
governments place emphasis on maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of the three 
largest joint ventures in Mongolia - the Erdenet Copper-Molybdenum conglomerate, the 
Ulaanbaatar Railway and the Mongolroscvetmet (non-ferrous metal) Mining Company. 
These companies provide the majority of the Mongolia's budget. In addition, over 250 
Russian-Mongolian small and medium-size businesses operate in Mongolia. Direct ties 
and cooperation between bordering regions have increased. 
Russian President Putin's historic visit to Ulaanbaatar in November 2000 ended 
"some degree of coldness" that had emerged in the two countries' relationships since 
1990.27 The visit was important in that it assessed Russian-Mongolian relations of the 
past decade. Both sides developed a definite plan for bilateral cooperation in political, 
economical, trade, cultural, scientific, and humanitarian fields. A joint communique 
reflected all the agreements reached by the two presidents. 
Russian analysts point out that the neutrality and sovereignty of Mongolia 
represent a considerable security element in Asia, given the geostrategic position of 
China. They write that in the event of a dominant Chinese position in Mongolia, the 
26 "The visit of Byambadorj, Deputy Speaker of Mongolian Parliament, to Russian Duma." From the 
speech by P.V. Romanov, Russian Duma Acting Speaker. Zuunii Medee (Century News), No. 27 (601), 1 
February 2001. Available [OnLine] http://www.mol.mnlzuunii_medeelzm2/main.htm 
27 "Full text of the interview with O.M. Derkovskyi, the Russian Ambassador to Mongolia," Zuunii Medee 
(Century News), N27 (601), 1 February 2001. Available [OnLine] 
http://www.mol.mnlzuunii_medee/zm2/main.htm 
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Russian Far East would become more vulnerable.28 Others in Russia express concern 
about the weakening of economic position of Russia in Mongolia and stress the 
importance of regaining economic leverage. From a strategic perspective, they argue, 
Russia is interested not only in a friendly Mongolia, but also in a Mongolia strategically 
allied with Russia. Their concern lies in a dramatic shift in the balance of power in Asia if 
China or any other nation dominates Mongolia.29 
Finally, despite positive the developments noted earlier, vanous contentious 
issues continue to bedevil bilateral relations. The issue of the debt has yet to be solved. 
Historical grievances, domestic political constraints, and cross-border smuggling and 
livestock rustling complicate bilateral ties. Nonetheless, because of its geographic 
proximity and historical ties, the Russian Federation will continue to be a major player in 
Mongolian foreign and security relations. 
D. MONGOLIA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA 
1. Cold-War Relations 
The 1949 victory of Mao and the establishment of a new relationship between the 
Soviet Union. and China caused a major change in the position of the Mongolia. 
Ulaanbaatar recognized the People Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. The new 
government in China, because of its relative political and military weaknesses, had no 
28 Anatoly Arbatov's words in TumurchulUllll G., "Mongolia's Foreign Policy Revisited: Relations with 
Russia and the PRe into the 1990s" in Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan, ed. 
Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Ellernan (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1999), 282. 
29 Golrnan M. I., "The present Russian-Mongolian relationship" in East and Asia on the Eve of the 21" 
Century (Moscow: Institute for Eastern Studies, 1998),275-281. 
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alternative but to accept the fait accompli and confinn the Nationalist Republic of China 
regime's acceptance in 1946 of Mongolia's independence.3o 
However, whenever the opportunity presented itself, the PRC tried to orient the 
MPR toward itself and reassert its authority over Mongolia. Mao reportedly sought but 
failed to obtain Stalin's support for a re-annexation of Mongolia in return for full Chinese 
participation in the Korean War.3 1 
The PRC changed its tactics when direct political intervention did not work. It 
attempted to regain influence in the MPR through economic weapons. Following the 
signing of a Sino-Mongol economic and cultural cooperation agreement in 1952, Beijing 
made available to Mongolia large amounts of economic aid, including around 30,000 
workers.32 Other proposals and projects involving a large amount of Chinese labor force 
alarmed Mongols and the Soviets. The sparsely populated Mongolia needed manpower, 
but such a massive work force would have swamped and overwhelmed the Mongolians. 
Considering the military-strategic implications of a Chinese-controlled heavy industry 
and a Chinese popUlation of several hundred thousand close to the Soviet border, the 
USSR forestalled the Chinese move and effectively reasserted its monopoly over 
Mongolia. In direct response to the Sino-Indian border dispute, China and Mongolia 
officially demarcated the borders by treaty in 1962. 
30 Stobdan P., "Mongolia after the Cold War" (Asian Strategic Review 1993-1994),219. 
31 Marko Milivojevic, The Mongolian Revolution of 1990: Stability or Conflict in Inner Asia? (Conflict 
Studies No. 242, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, June 1991), 17. 
32 Ravdan Bold, "Northeast Asian security perspectives: the view from Mongolia" in Bold R., Mongolia '5 
Strategic View (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 9. 
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As Sino-Soviet cooperation grew into competition and then confrontation, 
Beijing's economic strategy towards Mongolia collapsed. The growing split between the 
two giants led relations between the PRC and MPR onto a downward spiral. Ulaanbaatar 
moved resolutely into the Soviet camp, accusing China of an "annexationist" policy 
towards Mongolia. Chinese leaders placed Mongolia in the same category as the Soviet 
Union - calling it "revisionist" and accusing it of not adhering to true Marxism-Leninism. 
The growing Soviet presence in the MPR increased Chinese concern. The deployment of 
substantial Soviet military forces along the Sino-Mongol border after 1965 made China 
particularly vulnerable to a Soviet attack. 
The relations between the two countries did not begin to thaw until the death of 
Mao in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping's reemergence in 1977. Concurrent with improvements 
in Moscow-Beijing relations in the 1980s, Ulaanbaatar sent a delegation to the PRC in 
1984 to discuss developing bilateral relations. In 1986, PRC and MPR reached a five-
year agreement on trade. However, formal normalization of relations did not happen until 
the Deng-Gorbachev summit meeting in Beijing in May 1989. 
2. Post-Cold War Relations 
The Sino-Soviet rapprochement and the dissolution of the Soviet Union allowed 
China and Mongolia to normalize and then improve bilateral relations. The complete 
pUllout of Soviet troops decreased the threat to China from Mongolian territory. These 
events, coupled with China's and Mongolia's open policies, have laid the foundations for 
improving bilateral relations. 
The President Ochirbat's May 1990 visit to China was the first high-level visit 
since 1952. It was a historic milestone in his country's difficult relationship with China. 
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Chinese President Yang Shangkun reciprocated by visiting Ulaanbaatar in 1991, the first 
such visit in the 30 years. The cornerstone of the renewed diplomatic contacts was a new 
Sino-Mongolian "Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation." Signed in April 1994 
in Ulaanbaatar by Premiers Li Peng and Jasrai, it laid a new political and legal foundation 
for the growth of bilateral ties. The document removed China's fear of disturbance in its 
northern border area. It states that, 
Neither party shall enter any political-military bloc, not sign any 
agreement with a third party which may threaten the state sovereignty and 
security of the other party, and not allow the use of each other's territory to 
harm the state sovereignty and security of the other party. "33 
The wording of the treaty clearly expresses the Chinese desire to prevent another 
"Russia" from using Mongolia as the USSR did during the Cold War. 
Strengthening of bilateral diplomatic ties has continued, with the recent visits by 
Mongol President Bagabandy and Chinese President Jiang Zemin to each other's capitals 
in December 1998 and July 1999, respectively. 
Sino-Mongol economic relations meanwhile have substantially grown. Bilateral 
trade volume in 1999 was estimated at US$250 million or more than 500 percent over the 
figure in 1990. China has become Mongolia's second largest trade partner after Russia. In 
direct investment, China tops other countries in the world, with nearly 300 Chinese 
enterprises making investment in Mongolia.34 Mongolia's rapidly growing economic 
linkages with China is causing concern and fear among Mongolians. The fears stem from 
33 "Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between Mongolia and the People's Republic of China, 
29 April 1994, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia" in "Mongolian Defense White Paper, 1997-1998" (Ulaanbaatar: 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998). 
34 "Jiang Zernin visits Mongolia as an Act to strengthen Good-Neighborly and Firendly Relations with the 
Neighboring Countries." Hong Kong Zhongguo Tongxun, 19 July 1999. 
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claims, although not official, within China that Mongolia is a part of Greater China. 
China, according to these views, wants to see all Mongols absorbed into the Chinese 
nation and the territory administered by Mongolia incorporated into the PRC.35 
Mongolians are concerned about China's leverage over their economy and fear 
that Chinese purchase of land and of shares in the Mongolian Stock Exchange may offer 
them considerable influence. With the weight of popUlation and cash on China's side, 
there is a possibility that first capital transfer and then population transfer could make 
Mongolia excessively dependent on China. 
The Chinese, in tum, are apprehensive about the rise of an anti-Communist, 
nationalist, and democratic spirit in Mongolia and its effects on Mongols of the PRC's 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Republic (IMAR). They have repeatedly condemned and 
sometimes imprisoned so-called "separatists" in Inner Mongolia for efforts to affirm 
Mongol ethnicity and to promote Pan-Mongol nationalism.36 
In short, relations between the two are likely to remain cautious and practical. 
Both sides try to avoid sensitive and contentious political issues. Beijing is currently 
dangling an economic carrot to regain influence in Mongolia. The immediate threat to 
Mongolia's security is thus economic rather than military in nature. 
E. MONGOLIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
Mongolia and the United States were on opposite sides during the Cold War. The 
US and its allies were ideological adversaries of Ulaanbaatar. Until the end of the bipolar 
35 Denny Roy, China's Foreign Policy (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1998),53. 
36 Morris Rossabi, "Mongolia in the 1990s: from Commissars to Capitalists?" Available [Online] 
http://www.soros.orglmongolialrossabi.html [Feb 10,2000] 
28 
superpower conflict, Ulaanbaatar joined the Soviets in their policies of anti-imperialism 
and anti-capitalism. 
The warming m US-Soviet relations and the demise of the USSR allowed 
Mongolia to establish diplomatic ties with the US. Following the US government's 
extension of diplomatic recognition to Mongolia in July 1987, economic and political 
relations between the two countries have been on an upward swing. US Secretary of State 
James Baker paid the first official American visit to Mongolia in August 1990 and 
assured his hosts that "the United States will be your third neighbor." In 1991, President 
Ochirbat visited Washington, the first such visit by a Mongolian president. The US 
government has supported Mongolia's commitment to democracy, market-oriented 
economy, and integration into the broader Asia-Pacific security network. The May 1998 
official visit of Secretary of State Albright to Ulaanbaatar was a reaffirmation of the US 
commitment to closer cooperation in various spheres with Mongolia. It highlighted the 
continuing US support for Mongolia's democracy.37 
Washington granted Mongolia most-favored-nation (MFN) status m 1991 and 
quota-free access to the US textile market to help in reducing economic dependence on 
Russia and China. Investment of American firms has penetrated other sectors such as oil, 
heavy equipment, cashmere, and tourism. In addition, the US attitude towards 
Mongolia's reform and democratic process influences the level of other developed 
countries' participation. 
37 "Joint Statement on US-Mongolian Relations, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2 May 1998." Available 
[OnLine] http://secretary .state.gov/www/statements/1998/980502.html [May 16, 2000] 
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Ulaanbaatar publicly appreciates the aid and development assistance provided by 
the US during this challenging time for Mongolia. US development aid to Mongolia 
totaled over $50 million between 1991-1996 and the US Agency for International 
Development has earmarked $6 million in aid during FY1999.38 
In addition, both countries have continued to expand political dialogue on 
international and security issues. High-level political exchanges to each other's capitals 
have become regular. Both sides note their satisfaction with military-to-military relations. 
Washington continues to support specialized military training and education through the 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Other bilateral defense 
cooperation includes joint training in areas such as disaster relief operation and 
humanitarian assistance. The US defense budget for fiscal year 2001 includes a new 
addition: $2 million to finance communications equipment for Mongolia's border patrol. 
This would represent half of the US military financing for all of Asia.39 The willingness 
of the Mongolian military to participate in international peacekeeping missions rests the 
US military support and assistance in acquiring the necessary skills. American experts 
conduct seminars and briefings for the Mongol officers and sergeants.40 However, US 
military has been careful that the Mongol-American defense cooperation does not 
38 Ralph A. Cossa, "Assuring Mongolia's Independence, economic security, and Ecological Balance" in 
Regional Security Issues and Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, No.7), 15. 
39 "A shift in Asia, as Mongolia stirs," Mongolia, Global Intelligence Update, 19 May 2000. Available 
[OnLine] http://www.stratfor.com/Services/giu2000/051900.ASP 
40 "The possibility of inclusion of Mongol soldiers in peacekeeping forces," Uduriin Toli (Daily News), 20 
August 1999. Available [OnLine] http://www.mol.rrm!udur_tolilue4/ulstur.htm[Aug20. 1999] 
"The US assistance to Mongolian peacekeeping forces," Zuunii Medee (Century News), 2 February 2001. 
Available [OnLine] http://www.mol.rrm!zuuoii_medee/zm2/main.htm [Feb 2, 2001] 
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develop into a type of special military-to-military relationship. This would raIse 
suspicions among Russians and Chinese.41 
From Mongolian side, Ulaanbaatar recognIzes that expanding bilateral ties 
between the two countries in various spheres and US efforts to facilitate Mongolia's 
transition to democracy provides Mongolia with a sense of security. The General 
Secretary of the National Security Council of Mongolia, Ravdan Bold writes, "The US 
holds the key to Mongolia's re-entry into the world, not only in development but also in 
security terms, despite being geographically separated."42 Mongolia is aware of its 
neighbors ' inclination not to involve outside countries in an area of their traditional 
influence. Therefore, it is essential to demonstrate that this bilateral military cooperation 
does not portend to be an alternative to Russian-Mongolian relations, but rather as 
supplementary mechanism to contribute to the region's stability.43 
In general, both the United States and Mongolia enjoy good bilateral ties with 
each other. Mongol-American relations have some advantages over Mongolia's relations 
with Russia and China. This is due to the absence of past negative legacy, conflicting 
national objectives, and different views on some major issues. Many in Mongolia assess 
the United States as a benign superpower that can protect the interests of vulnerable states 
from the hegemonic ambitions of regional powers. United States relations act as a 
counterweight to Russia and China. 
41 Ralph A. Cossa, "Assuring Mongolia 's Independence, economic security, and Ecological Balance" in 
Regional Security Issues and Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, No. 7), 16. 
42 Ravdan Bold, "Northeast Asian security perspectives : the view from Mongolia" in Bold R., Mongolia 's 
Strategic View (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 13. 
43Ibid. , 14. 
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F. MONGOLIA'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES 
Throughout Cold War, the Soviet-Mongolian relationship dominated all aspects 
of foreign affairs of Mongolia. A by-product of the relations between the two was 
Ulaanbaatar's diplomatic relations with the members of Warsaw Pact, North Korea, 
Vietnam, and later with Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. However, Mongolia also 
established relations with non-communist countries. For example, in 1955, India became 
the first non-communist country to recognize Ulaanbaatar and, in 1963 United Kingdom 
was the first Western nation to develop relations with Mongolia. 
The Soviet retreat presented Mongolia an opportunity to look both to its east and 
west. Mongolia' s open policy has encouraged a number of countries to expand their 
interest in the potentially rich resources of Mongolia. 
Mongolia and Japan established diplomatic ties as early as 1972. Politics 
prevented this opemng from developing into a full relationship. Japan is today 
Mongolia' s most generous friend. Since 1990, it has positively responded to Mongolia' s 
request for economic and technical assistance. The aid provided by Japan has been a 
tremendous relief for the Mongolia's faltering economy in its transition to a market 
system. The Former Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu reciprocated the 1990 
Mongolian leader's visit to Tokyo in 1991. He pledged to give US$15 million as 
immediate economic aid and decided to hold an international conference on aid to 
Mongolia, to be attended by US, Germany, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
and the European Union (EU). Co-sponsored by Japan and the World Bank (WB), the 
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first Tokyo aid donors' conference in September 1991 brought the prospect of large-scale 
international relief for the economy of Mongolia. 
Tokyo granted Mongolia the MFN status III 1990. Mongolia and Japan have 
signed a number of economic cooperation agreements. After Russia and China, Japan 
now ranks as Mongolia's third largest trading partner. Mongolia offers Japan immense 
natural resources such as iron ore, coal, copper, tin, silver, gold, and uranium in return for 
Japanese capital, technological assistance, and consumer goods. 
Japan is also the largest aid donor to Mongolia, accounting for about forty per 
cent of its total foreign assistance. By organizing the donors' conference, it has been 
instrumental in focusing the developed nations' attention and assistance on Mongolia. For 
reasons of geography, history, and economy, Japan plays an important role in Mongolia's 
search for new foreign policy options to guarantee its future security, independence, and 
economic prosperity.44 Mongolia works to develop the relationship with Japan into a 
comprehensive partnership. The "Joint Statement on Friendship and Cooperation," issued 
during the 1998 visit of the Mongolian president to Japan, is the reaffirmation of this 
commitment. 
South Korea is another key Northeastern country that plays an important role in 
Mongolia's economic reconstruction. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 
April 1990, South Korea has developed good relations with Mongolia. South Korea has 
assisted in improving television broadcasting and telecommunication and in providing 
44 Marko Milivojevic, The Mongolian Revolution of 1990: Stability or Conflict in Inner Asia? (Conflict 
Studies No. 242, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, June 1991),21. 
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private sector with managerial expertise. The bilateral ties between the two culminated in 
a June 1999 visit to Ulaanbaatar by Republic of Korea President Kim Dae Jung. During 
the visit, Mongolia endorsed President Kim's "Sunshine Policy." 
In Western Europe, Germany is the cornerstone of Mongolia diplomacy. 
Germany, following Japan, also plays an important role in the economic development of 
Mongolia. Mongolia sends military officers to Germany's colleges and academies. 
Mongolia's search for new allies has also led it to cultivating closer ties with 
countries in Southeast and Central Asia, such as India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and the five Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. 
Concerns over nuclear weapons provide a shared interest with Central Asia. Another step 
toward enhanced relations center on Central Asia's joint peacekeeping battalion. The 
participation of Mongolian platoon in this formation in 2000 will help to lead Mongolia 
into NATO's Partnership for Peace program. 
G. CONCLUSION 
During the Cold War Mongolia's ties with the Soviet Union and its allies 
dominated its international relations. It committed itself to "strengthen the unity, 
friendship and cooperation of the countries of the world socialist system."45 Mongolia 
sided firmly with the USSR on every major foreign policy issue during this period, 
including Albania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet split with China.46 Its military build-up 
450le Bruun and Ole Odgaard, Mongolia in Transition (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1996),219. 
46 Turnurchuluun G., "Mongolia's Foreign Policy Revisited: Relations with Russia ~nd the PRe into the 
1990s" in Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan, ed. Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. 
Elleman (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. New Y orIc, 1999), 278. 
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through alliance with the Soviet Union and de-facto Warsaw Pact membership was the 
backbone of Mongolia's external security management during the Cold War. 
With the end of the Soviet empire, Mongolia rid itself of its long-standing 
subservience to Moscow. It was able to adopt a multi-pillared foreign policy approach. 
The approach acknowledged the opportunities of developing meaningful relations with a 
great number of nations and the multiplicity of areas of cooperation where Mongolia can 
engage. 
Russia and China are important components of Mongolia's multi-pillared foreign 
policy. Renouncing its excessive dependence on one of its neighbors, Mongolia signed 
"treaties of friendly relations and cooperation" with Russia and China. The principle 
underpinning bilateral relations with both of them are even-handedness and balance, good 
neighborliness, equal and mutually beneficial cooperation.47 The essence of the 
evenhandedness and balance is to avoid the situation when one of Mongolia's neighbors 
becomes an enemy while the other becomes the only guarantor of its security. 
The relations with the United States is a major dimension in Mongolia's foreign 
policy. Mongolia works to develop the relationship with Japan into a comprehensive 
partnership. Mongolia sees as its priority the development of relations with South Korea 
in Northeast Asia, India and Singapore in South Asia, Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada in Asia-Pacific, Germany and France in Europe, and other Central Asian 
countries. 
47 "Concept of National Security of Mongolia." Available [OnLine] 
http://www.extmin.mnlconcept_oCnational_security_ofm.htm [Oct 10, 2000] 
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In order to gain recognition and seek support of other countries, Mongolia has 
worked hard to integrate itself with the dynamic of Asia-Pacific region while showing it 
is a good citizen. Ulaanbaatar sees each country as a partner in Mongolia's economic 
development. It has sought "third partnerships" to escape the narrow geopolitical and 
geostrategic frameworks provided by its history and secure the country's future. 
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IV. MONGOLIA'S OPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With disproportionately huge neighbors, Mongolia's vulnerability has been an 
unpleasant reality. Major changes in Russia and China have had a profound impact on the 
national security of Mongolia. The theme of Mongolia's political survival and 
vulnerability has always loomed large in Mongolia. The belief that a sovereign state must 
independently manage its foreign affairs fuels this anxiety. 
In the past century, Mongolia employed different means to ensure its survival and 
offset its vulnerability. The approaches used have ranged from: 
• Military build-up, 
• Cold War Alliance, 
• Bilateral relations, 
• Participation in regional and global multilateral security, political, and economic 
organizations. 
This chapter analyzes Mongolia's approaches to security and independence and 
the resulting national security concepts. From 1911 to early 1990s, Mongolia transitioned 
from a status of de facto independence in 1911 to de jure independence in 1946. During 
this time, it utilized a balance of power approach through alliance and national military 
build-up. Since the end of the Cold War, Mongolia has relied chiefly on diplomacy and 
multilateral cooperation. This study illustrates that while a realist perspective explains 
Mongolia's Cold-War approach to security, a neoliberal concept embraces the post-
communist policies. 
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B. BALANCE OF POWER APPROACH 
1. The Past 
Mongolian security thinking and behavior throughout the Cold War period were 
based on the realist tradition. Security through power (alliance and armament build-up) 
was the dominant approach. Mongolia managed its external security by maintaining and 
strengthening its alliance with the Soviet Union and by building up its own armed forces. 
Within the framework of Soviet-Mongolian defense treaties, the two sides agreed to 
"undertake all necessary measures with the purpose of ensuring security of the two 
countries, including defense."48 The treaties paved the way for the large-scale 
deployment of Soviet troops in Mongolia. This transformed the Sino-Mongolian border 
into de-facto Sino-Soviet border.49 Mongolia's rationale behind the alliance strategy was 
not a regional distribution of power but the presence of a preponderant of Chinese threat. 
Mongolia built up its armaments and the number of military personnel to "a level 
sufficient to carry out joint operations with the Soviet armed forces" to minimize the 
military threat from the south. 50 
This dominant security paradigm limited the scope of security to military 
dimension. The government downplayed to a certain degree other security Issues. 
Economics served security and military policy. Ideology was a major tool used by the 
48 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and MPR, January 1966, 
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. 
49 See Ravdan Bold, "Military Aspects of Mongolian Geopolitics" in Bold R., Mongolia's Strategic View 
(Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996). 
50 "Mongolian Defense White Paper 1997-1998" (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolia's Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1998),5. 
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Communist Party to exert economic pressure and provide justification to obtain security 
and military goals.51 Central decision makers and the public shared a belief that a military 
threat from China was real and dangerous. The history and behavior of China, intensified 
by the huge differences in population, drove this threat perception. 
The Soviet umbrella ensured Mongolia's security and survival as a nation. 
However, it entailed significant costs: 
• Restricted Mongolia's freedom of action, 
• Resulted in a significant dilution of its national sovereignty, 
• Precluded ties with non-Soviet bloc countries,52 
• Made Soviet enemies Mongolia's enemies,53 and 
• Increased the Chinese hostility. 54 
As Mongolia became heavily dependent on economIC aid, the Soviets enjoyed a 
preponderance of influence over its partner's policy. This "entrapment" could have cost 
dearly for Mongolia if armed conflict between USSR and PRC had broken out and 
Mongolia had become a theater of hostilities. "Soviet nuclear weapons were based at a 
site some twenty miles from Ulaanbaatar and in the southern part of the country," 
Mongolia's Ambassador to the UN Enkhsaihan stated, adding that "the devices were 
51 Robert Rupen, How Mongolia is reanv ruled: a Political History of the Mongolian People's Republic, 
1900-1978 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 124. 
52 Bold R., "Northeast Asian security perspectives: the view from Mongolia" in Bold R., Mongolia's 
Strategic View (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996),8. 
53Batbayar Baterdene, "Mongolia's experience of transition." Available [OnLine] 
http://www.baabaLcomlbooks/experience.htrnl [July 24,2000] 
54 Marko Milivojevic, The Mongolian Revolution of 1990: Stability or Conflict in Inner Asia? (Conflict 
Studies No. 242, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, June 1991). 
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trained on Beijing. China, in tum, targeted these installations with its own weapons."55 
The threat worked both ways: Mongolia might be a platfonn for Soviet aggression in 
China or for Chinese aggression aimed at USSR.56 
The Sino-Soviet joint communique of May 1989 marked the end of the Soviet 
umbrella for Mongolia. The Soviet's abandonment of its ally "has thrown Mongolia off 
balance." The Soviet military and economic retreat hurt the primary security mechanism 
and economy of Mongolia. However, it presented an opportunity for Mongolians to 
conduct domestic and foreign policy independent of the Soviets. 
2. The Present: Is This Approach Possible Today? 
The past decade has witnessed major internal and external transfonnations taking 
place in Mongolia. These have profoundly affected Mongolia's traditional conception of 
security. Mongolia overthrew communist rule and embarked on the path toward 
democracy. The government introduced political pluralism and a market-based economy. 
These events facilitated the transfonnation of the ideological and institutional foundations 
of security. Improved Sino-Mongolian bilateral ties and the end of Cold War have created 
a new external security environment. The positive external changes have made it 
imperative for Mongolia to replace the old national security concept based on "southern 
threat." 
55 Steve Goldstein, "Mongolia takes on the big five at UN," Herald, 31 August 2000, p9, A8. 
56 Robert Rupen, How Mongolia is really ruled: a Political History o/the Mongolian People's Republic, 
1900-1978 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979),85. 
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Mongolia's new "National Security Concept" is comprehensive and 
multidimensional. It encompasses both the external and internal elements. Mongolia does 
not regard security primarily as a military problem. Its notion of security is broader 
incorporating political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions. The "Concept" 
dermes Mongolia's national interests as the assured existence of the Mongolian 
people, their culture and way of life, the independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, inviolability of the frontier, relative economic independence, ecologically 
balanced development and national unity.57 
Aware of the political realities in Mongolia and the international community, as 
well as the evolution of international relations and power politics, Mongolia has defined 
the following as the primary areas of its concern: 
• security of the existence of Mongolia; 
• security of the social order and state system; 
• security of citizen's rights and freedoms; 
• security of information 
• security of Mongolian civilization; 
• security of the population and its gene pool; 
• ecological security.58 
The new security concept divides the factors affecting the national security into 
internal and external by their origins and into immediate, temporary, long-term, and 
57 "Concept of National Security of Mongolia." Available [OnLine] 
http://www.extmin.mnlconcepcoCnationaLsecurity_ofm.htm [Oct 10,2000] 
58 Ibid. 
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petmanent by their duration. Due to the changed threat environment, Mongolia has 
developed new approaches for its national security. They combine "social, political, 
organizational, economic, diplomatic, military, intelligence, and legal means, unilaterally 
or through the development of international cooperation."59 
This non-alignment policy replaces the fotmer realist alliance approach. Factors 
such as history, the experience of alliance with the fotmer Soviet Union, and geopolitical 
isolation influence Mongolia to pursue such a policy. The "Concept" states that, in 
peacetime, Ulaanbaatar "neither will join any military-political alliance nor will allow 
foreign troops stationed within its territory unless an appropriate law is adopted."60 
However, both the "Concept" and the constitution do not deny the possibility of an 
alliance approach. Mongolia's threat perception conditions the external security 
management. If Mongolia perceives the external environment as hostile, or threat to 
national interests as imminent, it will seek external sources of military assistance. 
Mongolia's non-alignment concept also includes a policy of "non-involvement 
and neutrality in the disputes between its two neighbors."61 The past century has 
witnessed the exacerbation and notmalization of Sino-Russian relations on four 
occasIOns. Therefore, there is no guarantee that these big states will not be m 
confrontation with each other again.62 These historical facts and the experience of 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., or "Concept of Mongolia's Foreign Policy." Available [OnLine] 
http://www.extmin.mnIconcept_oCforeign-policy.htm [Dec 23,2000] 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ravdan Bold, The Security of Small State: Option for Mongolia, No.9 (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2000), 17. 
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entanglement in the two's disputes account for the predominance of such a policy. It is 
important to note that this neutral posture applies only to disputes between Russia and 
China. However, if such disputes affect the country's national interests, this policy is 
void. 
It is obvious that the national security of a country with a small population, vast 
territory, and poor economy cannot solely depend on its military power. To offset its 
vulnerability through peacetime alliance is neither possible nor viable. Any alliance with 
a third power (if it were available) would adversely affect Mongolia's security. It will 
unduly alarm Russia and China, engender suspicion, and "hypothetically jeopardize" 
their interests.63 The 1993 Russian-Mongol and the 1994 Sino-Mongol treaties clearly 
express the Russian and Chinese desire to prevent another "USSR" from using Mongolia 
as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. 
Since early 1990s, Mongolia has downsized its military personnel by several 
thousands and has aimed to maintain "compact, capable and professionally-oriented 
armed forces."64 Why must Mongolia have armed forces? The first civilian defense 
minister explained, "Neither of our neighbors intends to attack Mongolia, but neither do 
we neglect that some incidents might develop which threaten Mongolian security."65 
However, the absence of any visible external threat and elevation of economic 
development to central importance underlie the low priority accorded to the military 
63 Ravdan Bold, "Northeast Asian security perspectives: the view from Mongolia" in Bold R., Mongolia's 
Strategic View (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 13. 
64 "The Basic Issues of Defense Policy of Mongolia." Available [OnLine] 
http://www.pmis.gov.mn!mdefi.englishldsystem.htm (Jan 15,2001] 
65 Karnio R., "The Jane's Interview", Jane's Defense Weekly, vol. 28, No. 14, p. 64, 8 October 1997. 
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aspect of national security. The military's missions emphasize peacetime roles such as 
border patrol, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and preparation for peacekeeping 
commitments. The Ministry of Defense aims to boost professionalism while reducing 
costs and threats. 
The Mongolian government has signed formal agreements on military-to-military 
cooperation with the United States and other countries. Realism cannot adequately 
account for these agreements. Strengthening its relations with them, however, is essential 
to giving Mongolia a greater sense of security and confidence in its political and 
economic reform.66 Another means for achieving good relations with the US and other 
developed countries are Mongolia's democratization. That Mongolia is more or less a 
fully democratic country has significantly increased sympathy in Asian and Western 
democracies. 
Today this context determines whether Mongolia should deploy realist or 
neoliberalist prescriptions in its external security management. Diplomacy and 
comprehensive regional cooperation top the list of approaches to security. The alliance 
approach is not possible and viable at peacetime, given the unique circumstances of 
Mongolia. 
C. MULTILATERAL APPROACH 
Mongolia considers its security and future development within the framework of 
the Asia-Pacific region, notably Northeast Asia. Mongolia deems its membership in 
66 Ravdan Bold, "Northeast Asian security perspectives: the view from Mongolia" in Bold R., Mongolia's 
Strategic View (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 14. 
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multilateral security and political organizations and integration with global and regional 
economies as a key international security strategy. 
1. Asia-Pacific Multilateral Arrangements: Overview 
For a variety of historical, cultural, geographic, and developmental reasons, the 
Asia-Pacific has been a latecomer to multilateral security. With the exception of the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Australia-New Zealand-United 
States (ANZUS) treaty of 1951, multilateral security arrangements were rarities in the 
Asia-Pacific during the Cold War. The Cold War environment was antithetical to 
multilateralism. Instead, bilateralism prevailed in the form of alliances radiating from 
Washington and Moscow. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
formed in 1967, was the remarkable exception to this rule. However, ASEAN's purpose 
was not as a security institution. Rather, the member-states directed their efforts toward 
building trust and confidence, developing principles and norms to govern their 
interaction, preventing disputes, and bolstering the collective and diplomatic weight of 
the members.67 
Owing to the end of the Cold War and to dynamic economic developments, the 
regional security structure has been undergoing a profound transformation. Economic 
factors, particularly the high rate of economic growth and high degree of economic 
interdependence, are changing both the structure of security relations and the systemic 
tendencies toward conflict and peace.68 
67 Muthiah Alagappa, "Asian Security Practice" (California: Stanford University Press, 1998),635. 
68 Ball D., "Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Challenges in the Post-Cold 
War Era" in Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng 
(Anuonk, New York, London, England: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2000). 
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As result, although the regIOn IS enJoymg a period of relative peace and 
tranquility, the security situation in Asia Pacific is still volatile and complex. High 
capability, abiding animus, proximity of the four major powers to the strategic field of 
play, and the absence of any multilateral security regime characterizes the regional 
security picture.69 A number of factors cause anxieties among these nations. Some argue 
that the following strategic developments represent primary areas of concern: 
• uncertainty about China's strategic intentions; 
• uncertainty about the US military presence in the region; 
• uncertainty surrounding Japan's future identity; 
• unpredictability regarding the North Korean policy toward South KoreaJo 
The above uncertainties, combined with the extraordinary economic growth, have 
induced certain states to increase resource allocation for their defense programs. Such 
moves, in tum, raise the prospect of a regional arms raceJl Persistence of the past 
problems (territorial disputes, divided nations, and nuclear proliferation) and emergence 
of new threats (economic and ecological concerns) add apprehensionJ2 
69 Samuel S. Kim, "East Asia and Globalization: Challenges and Responses" in East Asia and 
Globalization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Rowman and Littlefi~ld Publishers Inc., 2000), 13. 
70 See Muthiah Alagappa, "Asian Security Practice" (California: Stanford University Press 1998); Oh 
Kwan-chi, "The Anatomy of Anxiety in the Emerging East Asia Security Order"; Robert A. Manning, 
"Building Community or Building Conflict? A Typology of Asia Pacific Security Challenges" in Asia 
Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures ed., Ralph A. Cos sa (Washington D.C.: The Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1995). 
71 Ball D., "Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Challenges in the Post-Cold War 
Era" in Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng (Armonk, 
New York, London, England: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2000). 
72 Peter Van Ness, "Globalization and Security in East Asia" in East Asia and Globalization, ed. Samuel S. 
Kim, (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2000), 265-266. 
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The security strategies of the Asian countries are becoming broader and more 
complex. Strategies of self-help are still important. However, the norm of cooperative 
security is gaining ground. The awareness that multilateral measures can reduce the level 
of uncertainty and anxiety is also growing.73 Several factors have fueled Asian interest in 
broad-based multilateral security arrangements: 74 
• general apprehension about regional uncertainty and unpredictability; 
• the non-availability or distrust of bilateral alliance arrangements; 
• the weaknesses of national military capabilities; 
• ongoing power transition. 
The region is undergoing a "gradual erosion of realist thinking and new emphasis 
on cooperative security strategies."75 Asia has not duplicated the European integration in 
multilateral security structures. However, a clear signal of the growing broader regional 
commitment to multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region is the development of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). 
2. Multilateral Options for Mongolia 
ARF is so far the only Asia-Pacific region-wide vehicle for exchanges on security 
issues at the governmental level. Founded in 1994, it brings together foreign ministers 
73 Ralph A. Cos sa, Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures (Washington D. c.: The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 6; Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice 
(California: Stanford University Press, 1998),638. 
74 Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice (California: Stanford University Press, 1998),633-635. 
75 Peter Van Ness, "Globalization and Security in East Asia" in East Asia and Globalization, ed. Samuel S. 
Kim, (Rowrnan and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2000), 267. 
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from twenty two countries. ARF has made steady progress and contributions to promote 
confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolutions. It has initiated many 
proposals, such as an Asian arms registry, military transparency, and other confidence 
and security-building measures. However, some analysts consider ARF inadequate or 
'just a talking shop." Part of the problem is that the institutional culture of the ARF is 
antithetical to dramatic action. The ARF functions on the basis of consensus decision-
making and non-intervention in the affairs of member states. It does not have a system of 
a projected regional community, a collective security umbrella, or a concert of powers.76 
Ralph Cossa, the Executive Director of Pacific Forum CSIS, comments that the ARF 
needs to evolve beyond its useful but limited "talk shop" format not only to address the 
region's more sensitive security issues but also to develop joint procedures for dealing 
with them.77 Nonetheless, ARF's "talking shop" has laid the foundation of a change in 
security behavior among the ARF member-states. 
Australia inaugurated the concept of the APEC forum in 1989. APEC is not 
intended to become a multilateral security body. Its mandate is trade facilitation and 
liberalization. However, with accelerating pace of economic interdependence, it is 
76 Boutilier A. J., "Reflections on Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region in the 21 st Century," 
paper presented at the 3rd Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 
21-25 September 1999; Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice (California: Stanford University Press, 
1998),637. 
77 Ralph A. Cossa, "Bush's Emerging Asia Policy: What's Still Missing." Available [Online] 
http://www.csis.orglpacfor/pacOl06.htrnl 
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increasingly difficult to disaggregate regional security concerns from trade and economic 
issues. Its annual meeting can also have profound political and security consequences. 78 
CSCAP, established in 1993, provides a structured process for regional 
confidence building and security cooperation among countries and territories in the Asia-
Pacific region. It also focuses its efforts on providing direct support to the ARF. Several 
CSCAP issue-oriented working groups are focusing on specific topics outlined in various 
ARF communiques. These include international working groups on confidence and 
security building measures (CSBM), comprehensive and cooperative security, 
transnational cnme, and maritime security cooperation, along with a North Pacific 
Working Group (NPWG) focused on the establishment of frameworks for Northeast Asia 
security cooperation.79 This non-governmental body is ideally suited for tapping the 
region's intellectual resources. It entails a wide array of players - academicians, security 
specialists, and former and current foreign ministry and defense officials. 
3. Mongolia's International and Regional Cooperation 
Mongolia regards multilateralism is a one of the key components of the national 
security strategy. Several considerations command Mongolia's policy makers to pay 
more attention to multilateral security arrangements: 
• Such arrangements are considerably broader in terms of its substance, weight, and 
influence, as opposed to a bilateral alliance arrangement, where a greater state 
often subordinates a smaller nation's interests to its own. 
78 Ralph A. Cos sa, Asia Pacific Confidence and Security BUilding Measures (Washington D.C.: The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 7. 
79 Ralph A. Cos sa, "Assuring Mongolia's Independence, Economic Security, and Ecological Balance" in 
Regional Security Issues and Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, No.7), 18. 
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• Such arrangements can have constraining effect on or institutionally "tame" a 
possible hegemon. Through joint efforts, states can change and influence its 
ambitious policy. 
• They prevent a strong power from exploiting its superiority over weaker states. It 
does not allow a military power to impose its own ideas and interests. 
• For small nations, they open equal channels of dialogue with bigger powers. 
Small nations have an opportunity to advance their own ideas and initiatives 
irrespective of balance of forces. They have a possibility to equally participate 
and influence some developments rather than taking a passive stance. Both big 
powers and small countries enjoy equal rights in adopting decisions. 
• They can present a possibility for small countries to raise their recognition and 
support and uplift their status and prestige through their contributions to enhance 
security, peace, and stability. 
• They may complement or supplant self-help approaches (military capability) and 
facilitate the diversion of resources to domestic concerns. 
• They can help to minimize historical animosity and mistrust among nations, 
thereby reducing anxiety and uncertainty. 
• They may help isolated states to branch out from confined geopolitical positions. 
Overall, Mongolia's leaders see numerous benefits in full membership in multilateral 
security organizations. Multilateral political and security relations help not only to 
enhance the country's independence but also to consolidate its democracy. 
Mongolia attaches particular importance to the ARF. The July 1998 acceptance of 
Mongolia as a member of the ARF marked a major step in Ulaanbaatar's emergence from 
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over seventy years' domination by the Soviet Union. Mongolia is also a full member of 
the CSCAP. Mongolia takes an active part in the meetings and sessions of these 
organizations. Ulaanbaatar has hosted several meetings and conferences at governmental 
and non-governmental level. 
Mongolia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1996, becoming the 
first former communist country to negotiate entry into the organization since 1989. It also 
cooperates closely with the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and International 
Monetary Fund. 
Mongolia has also enrolled in a number of multilateral economic arrangements 
and schemes, such as the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP) and the 
Agricultural Cooperation and Support (ACS). Joining together with South Korea, China, 
and Russia, Ulaanbaatar has discussed forming a regional investment corporation to fund 
large infrastructure projects in Northeast Asia. 
Mongolia is pursuing further integration by trying to join APEC. Mongolian 
leaders have expressed a desire to develop and become a part of an ARF-type 
organization in Northeast Asia. It increasingly recognizes the .value of international 
cooperation to its security, economic survival, and status. 
D. CONCLUSION 
History, geopolitics, type of state, and level of economic, military, and social 
development have had a crucial bearing on Mongolia's security thinking and behavior. 
To ensure its security, Mongolia has used a variety of approaches, such as national 
defense build-up, alliance, strengthening bilateral relationships, diplomacy, and 
multilateral international and regional cooperation. 
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Realist perspective explains Mongolia's Cold War security thinking and behavior. 
During this time, the relationship of Ulaanbaatar with Beijing focused on China's 
security threat to Mongolia. The history and behavior of China shaped Mongolia's 
perception of the threat. The principal approaches to security were an alliance with the 
Soviet Union and a national military build-up. The USSR guaranteed the national 
security of Mongolia within the framework of Soviet-Mongolian mutual defense treaties. 
Concurrently, the government of Mongolia extensively built up the national military 
capability to complement this Soviet strategy. Ulaanbaatar regarded military security as 
more fundamental than any other type. Concern with internal security was weaker than 
with external security. 
Mongolia's approach through alliance with a strong power fostered a sense of 
security. However, it entailed negative consequences. Because of the military and 
economical dependence of Mongolia, the alliance developed into "patron-client 
relationship." The Soviet Union enjoyed a preponderance of influence over Mongolia's 
policy. 
Since the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, the fall of the Soviet Union, and 
the end of the Cold War, Mongolia has undergone radical internal and external 
transformations. The new 1992 constitution threw out the last vestiges of communism. 
Mongolia declared itself as a democratic state. Externally, the normalization of Sino-
Mongolian relations and Chinese new international position created a wholly new 
security environment. Today, Mongolia does not face any visible external threat. It does 
not have any serious dispute with its neighbors. The environment surrounding Mongolia 
is benign. 
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The new internal and systemic environment has deeply affected Ulaanbaatar's 
conception of security, resulting in new concept and security approaches. The new 
"Concept of National Security" of Mongolia is comprehensive and multidimensional. 
Political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental security figures into the national 
security agenda in addition to military factors. 
The government accords top priority to economic development. Understanding 
the interdependence between political, security, and economic issues has emerged. The 
general attitude in Mongolia is that a sound economic policy and general development 
are the only ways to further its national security. The primacy of economics and absence 
of a clear external threat warrant low priority to the military. Therefore, Mongolia 
maintains relatively small armed forces, stressing efficiency, mobility, and 
professionalism. 
Mongolia counts primarily on diplomacy and global and regional multilateral 
cooperation. Mongolia's primary goal is to retain friendly and balanced relations with 
Russia and China. Mongolia pursues a policy of non-alignment. Non-involvement and 
neutrality towards its neighbors figure into the security concept of Mongolia. Historical 
experience and geopolitical isolation persuade Mongolia to adopt this stance. It pursues 
such a policy as long as no overwhelming threat to its vital national interests emerges. 
A number of factors influence Mongolia's decision makers to rely on 
multilateralism. Through multilateral security mechanisms, Mongolia hopes to reduce 
historical animosities and mistrust among nations, restrain hegemonic ambitions of 
powerful countries, present equal rights to smaller nations, enhance international position 
and increase recognition of smaller nations, and ensure stable and peaceful environment. 
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To take advantage of these benefits Mongolia has become a member of numerous 
multilateral organizations. International financial structures also play an important role 
for Mongolia to attain its objectives. Ulaanbaatar is pursuing further integration with 
international and regional community. Mongolian leaders have a desire to develop and 
become a part of an ARF-type organization in Northeast Asia. Broadly speaking, old 
traditional realist approaches have given way to a new neoliberalist line. 
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v. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Geopolitical heritage has made political survival and existence of Mongols as a 
nation always prominent in Mongolia. Mongols who once ruled an empire encompassing 
both Russia and China centuries ago became a pawn in Asia's great game since the 1 i h 
century. Division of the Mongol nation, rule by Manchus, and Soviet domination 
thereafter have implanted in Mongols a sense of vulnerability and insecurity. The belief 
that a sovereign state must pursue self-determination enhances this unease. 
How to attain the costly objectives of national security has been the enduring 
problem for Mongolia. Since achieving international recognition as an independent state, 
Mongolia has deployed different approaches to its security and independence. 
A realist approach dominated Mongolia's external security for the seven decades 
before the demise of the Cold War. An alliance and national military build-up were the 
prevalent approaches to security. Maintaining and strengthening the alliance with the 
Soviet Union was crucial for Mongolia. This was imperative in light of Mongolia's 
historical relationship with China. Mongolia's realist behavior derived from its 
vulnerabilities: 
• Weak external defense, 
• Small and sparsely settled population, 
• Underdeveloped economy, and 
• Geographical isolation. 
Realistic alternatives to the Soviet Union were non-existent. Military-strategic interests 
formed the foundation of the Soviet's policy toward Mongolia. Communist economic and 
organizational structures were adapted to Mongol politics and society. Given the Soviets' 
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disproportionate military and economic advantage, the ties between the two grew into a 
"patron-client relationship." 
Soviet-Mongolian mutual defense treaties solidified their relationship. The 
treaties justified the stationing of the Soviet troops on Mongolia's territory. Supporting 
the Soviet strategy, Mongolia built up its armament and the numbers of military 
personnel. Economics served military-strategic policy and ideology justified the goals 
that defined much of what happened in Mongolia. The fundamental preoccupation of 
Mongolia's government was military security. Ulaanbaatar's perception of a "southern 
threat" stemmed from the memories of rule by Manchu Qing dynasty, the ill treatment 
and assimilation of Mongols in Inner Mongolia, and irredentist claims by Chinese 
leaders. 
The major benefit gained by Mongolians from the alliance was survival as a 
nation-state. However, it incurred significant costs. Moscow restricted Ulaanbaatar's 
freedom of action, precluded ties with non-Soviet bloc countries, and alienated Soviet 
enemies. Moreover, to the degree that the Soviet Union enhanced Mongolia's security, 
they threatened the security of China. 
The Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the end of 
the Cold War brought a new era to Mongolia. Dismantling the old political, economic, 
and social structures, Mongolia committed itself to democracy, market economy, and 
transparency. Systemic international changes, the end of the Soviet umbrella, democratic 
and economic reforms, and removal of Marxist-Leninist ideology from foreign and 
domestic policies led Mongolia to reevaluate its security policy and relations with both 
neighbors. 
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The new "Security Concept of Mongolia" reflects a profound shift from that of 
the communist period. The scope of security now includes political, economic, social, 
cultural, and ecological aspects. The concept designed new approaches to securing its 
redefined objectives. 
The realist approach through an alliance has become non-viable for Mongolia. 
Three considerations influence this: 
• Previous alliance experience and its consequences; 
• Russian and Chinese opposition to a third power exerting a strong influence on 
their borders; and 
• Great Powers unwillingness to sacrifice their relations with China and Russia. 
Mongolia now maintains a small military, stressing mobility, effectiveness, and 
professionalism. However, the need for economic development and the lack of a clear 
external threat constrain the possibility of a realist approach. 
Today, Mongolia seeks its security through political and diplomatic means such 
as unilateral efforts, splicing together bilateral frameworks, and multilateral regional and 
international cooperation. An example of unilateral measures is Mongolia's declaration 
of itself as a single nuclear-free state. This was important considering the two decades of 
nuclear threat that hung over Mongolia. This policy aimed not only to ensure the security, 
but also to contribute to strengthening the regional and global non-proliferation regime. 
Mongolia's security is one way or another connected with its two neighbors and 
their mutual relations. Therefore, Mongolia's relations with Russia and China constitute 
the cornerstone of its security policy. They receive top priority in Ulaanbaatar's foreign 
policy. Mongolia has signed bilateral treaties of friendly relations and cooperation with 
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both neighbors. Mindful of the consequences of pursuing unilateralism towards the 
Soviet Union in the past, Mongolia adopts a non-aligned and neutral posture concerning 
disputes between Russia and China. It adheres to the principle of a balanced relationship 
between its neighbors. 
The post-Cold War world order has presented an opportunity for Mongolia to 
break. its political isolation. The impact of the Sino-Soviet relations on Mongolia's fate 
has diminished. Diversifying its relations, Mongolia has found "third partners." This was 
the lacking ingredient under communism. This ingredient is the sum of nations, including 
countries such as the United States, Japan, Germany, and South Korea, whose interests in 
Mongolia have considerably grown. Close cooperation with these "third partners" is an 
important factor for Mongolia in counterbalancing the influence of its neighbors and 
carrying out its political and economic reforms. Mongolia's support from the 
international community provides a sense of security in relation to its neighbors. Russia's 
and China's dependence on foreign technology, investment, and assistance ensure the 
linkage of their regional policies to the opinions of these developed nations. 
Multilateralism is Mongolia's key international strategy to guarantee the national 
security and economic survival. Multilateral organizations serve significant security 
functions for Mongolia. Active participation in the work of the United Nations and its 
various components remains one of Mongolia's most important objectives. Mongolia is 
deeply interested in benefiting from the United Nations' increasing efforts to guarantee 
the independence and integrity of nations, especially smaller ones, in times of crisis. It is 
of great value to Mongolia to share the knowledge and experience accumulated by United 
Nations' institutions in diverse fields of developmental activity. 
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Mongolia sees its membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum as a major step 
toward enhancement of its security. It also plays an active role in nongovernmental 
bodies, such Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and Northeast Asian 
Security Dialogue. Next, Mongolia looks toward membership in APEC. Mongolia has 
been an enthusiastic supporter of establishing an official Northeast Asian security 
mechanism, both through Track I and Track II channels. However, given the diversity of 
security interests, threat perception, history, culture, and geography, an ARF-type 
security structure m Northeast Asia remams unfulfilled. However, any security 
mechanism in Northeast Asia would require the involvement ofthe United States, Russia, 
China, and Japan. Their participation in multilateral dialogues is essential to facilitate 
their positive interaction with the region's neighbors and to assuage their concerns. 
Mongolia hopes that all the operational multilateral frameworks can institutionalize 
cooperation and cordial relations among nations, prescribe norms and principles of 
behavior, proscribe unacceptable security practices, constrain hegemonic ambitions, and 
alter state behavior. 
It is uncertain for Mongolia and others how long the current stability and 
cooperation in Sino-Russian relations will last. History has seen alternate periods of 
cooperation and rivalry between Russia and China. It is fortunate for Mongolia today that 
its powerful neighbors are preoccupied with their own internal concerns. Mongolia 
should continue to use this opportunity to integrate itself further into the international 
environment, strengthen its external links, participate in multilateral structures, and 
develop itself as a crossroad of different civilizations and economies. It is a unique 
chance that Mongolia cannot afford to miss. With a coherent national strategy, active 
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diplomacy, accurate threat assessments, and innovative thinking, Mongolia will come out 
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